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Abstract—We consider a market where a set of wireless
operators compete for a large common pool of users. The
latter have a reservation utility of U0 units or, equivalently,
an alternative option to satisfy their communication needs. The
operators must satisfy these minimum requirements in order to
attract the users. We model the users decisions and interaction as
an evolutionary game and the competition among the operators
as a non cooperative price game which is proved to be a potential
game. For each set of prices selected by the operators, the
evolutionary game attains a different stationary point. We show
that the outcome of both games depends on the reservation
utility of the users and the amount of spectrum W the operators
have at their disposal. We express the market welfare and the
revenue of the operators as functions of these two parameters.
Accordingly, we consider the scenario where a regulating agency
is able to intervene and change the outcome of the market by
tuning W and/or U0. Different regulators may have different
objectives and criteria according to which they intervene. We
analyze the various possible regulation methods and discuss their
requirements, implications and impact on the market.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a city where 3 commercial operators (companies)
and one municipal operator offer WiFi Internet access to
the citizens (users). The companies charge for their services
and offer better rates than the municipal WiFi service which
however is given gratis. Users with high needs will select
one of the companies. However, if they are charged with
high prices, or served with low rates, a portion of them will
eventually migrate to the municipal network. In other words,
the municipal service constitutes an alternative choice for the
users and therefore sets the minimum requirements which the
commercial providers should satisfy. Apparently, the existence
of the municipal network affects both the user decisions and
the operators pricing policy. In different settings, the minimum
requirement can be an inherent characteristic of the users as
for example a lower bound on transmission rate for a particular
application, an upper bound on the price they are willing to pay
or certain combinations of both of these parameters. Again, the
operators can attract the users only if they offer more appealing
services and prices.
In this paper, we consider a general wireless communication
services market where a set of operators, compete to sell
their services to a common large pool of users. We assume
that users have minimum requirements or alternative options
to satisfy their needs which we model by introducing the
reservation utility U0, [1]. Users select an operator only if the
Fig. 1. The market consists of a set of operators competing over a common
pool of users. Each user selects one of the market operators or opts to abstain
from the market and be associated with the neutral operator. The latter models
the alternative out-of-the-market users option or their minimum service-price
requirements.
offered service and the charged price ensure utility higher than
U0. We analyze the users strategy for selecting operator and the
price competition among the operators under this constraint.
We find that the market outcome depends on U0 and on the
amount of spectrum each operator has at his disposal W .
Accordingly, we consider the existence of a regulating agency
who is interested in affecting the market and enforcing a more
desirable outcome, by tuning either W or U0. For example,
consider the municipal WiFi provider who is actually able
to set U0 and bias the competition among the commercial
providers. This is of crucial importance since in many cases the
competition of operators may yield inefficient allocation of the
network resources, [1] or even reduced revenue for them, [2].
We introduce a rigorous framework that allows us to analyze
the various methods through which the regulator can intervene
and affect the market outcome according to his objective.
Our model captures many different settings such as a WiFi
market in a city, a mobile/cell-phone market in a country
or even a secondary spectrum market where primary users
lease their spectrum to secondary users. In order to make our
study more realistic, we adopt a macroscopic perspective and
analyze the interaction of the operators and users in a large
time scale, for large population of users, and under limited
information. The operators are not aware of the users specific
Fig. 2. The oligopoly market consists of I operators and N users (S). Each
user is associated with one operator at each specific time slot. Every operator
i = 1, 2, . . . , I can serve more than one users at a certain time slot. The users
that fail to satisfy their minimum requirements, Ui ≤ U0, ∀i ∈ I , abstain
from the market and select the neutral operator P0.
needs and the latter cannot predict in advance the exact level
of service they will receive. Each operator has a total resource
at his disposal (e.g. the aggregate service rate) which is on
average equally allocated to his subscribers, [1], [4]. This is
due to the various network management and load balancing
techniques that the operators employ, or because of the specific
protocol that is used, [5]. Each user selects the operator that
will provide the optimal combination of service quality and
price. Apparently, the decision of each user affects the utility
of the other users. We model this interdependency as an
evolutionary game, [3] the stationary point of which represents
the users distribution among the operators and depends on
the charged prices. This gives rise to a non cooperative price
competition game among the operators who strive to maximize
their profits.
Central to our analysis is the concept or the neutral operator
P0 which provides to the users a constant and given utility of
U0 units. The P0 can be a special kind of operator, like the
municipal WiFi provider in the example above, or it can simply
model the user choice to abstain from the market. This way,
we can directly calculate how many users are served by the
market and how many abstain from it and select P0. Moreover,
P0 allows us to introduce the role of a regulating agency who
can intervene and bias the market outcome through the service
U0. We show that P0 can be used to increase the revenue of the
operators or the efficiency of the market. In some cases, both of
these metrics can be simultaneously improved at a cost which
is incurred by the regulator. Alternatively, the outcome of the
market can be regulated by changing the amount of spectrum
each operator has at his disposal. Different regulating methods
give different results and entail different cost for the regulator.
A. Related Work and Contribution
The competition of sellers for attracting buyers has been
studied extensively in the context of network economics, [6],
[7], both for the Internet and more recently for wireless
systems. In many cases, the competition results in undesirable
outcome. For example, in [1] the authors consider an oligopoly
communication market and show that it yields inefficient
resource allocation for the users. From a different perspective
it is explained in [2], that selfish pricing strategies may also
decrease the revenue of the sellers-providers. In these cases,
the strategy of each node (buyer) affects the performance of
the other nodes by increasing the delay of the services they
receive, [1] (effective cost) or, equivalently, decreasing the
resource the provider allocates to them, [4] (delivered price).
This equal-resource sharing assumption represents many dif-
ferent access schemes and protocols (TDMA, CSMA/CA, etc),
[5].
More recently, the competition of operators in wireless
services markets has been studied in [4], [13], [14], [15], [21].
The users can be charged either with a usage-based pricing
scheme, [13], or on a per-subscription basis, [14], [21]. We
adopt the latter approach since it is more representative of
the current wireless communication systems. We assume that
users may migrate (churn) from one operator to the other,
[21], and we use evolutionary game theory (EVGT) to model
this process, [9]. This allows us to capture many realistic
aspects and to analyze the interaction of very large population
of users under limited information. The motivation for using
EVGT in such systems is very nicely discussed in [15]. Due
to the existence of the neutral operator, the user strategy
is updated through a hybrid scheme based on imitation and
direct selection of P0. We define a new revision protocol
to capture this aspect and we derive the respective system
dynamic equations.
Although the regulation has been discussed in context of
networks, [6], it remains largely unexplored. Some recent work
[8], [11] study how a regulator or an intervention device may
affect a non-cooperative game among a set of players (e.g.
operators). However, these works do not consider hierarchical
systems, with large populations and limited information. Our
contribution can be summarized as follows: (i) we model the
wireless service market using an evolutionary game where
the users employ a new hybrid revision protocol, based both
on imitation and direct selection of a specific choice, namely
the P0. We derive the differential equations that describe the
evolution of this system and find the stationary points, (ii)
we define the price competition game for I operators and
the particular case that users have minimum requirements, or
equivalently, alternative choices/offers, (iii) we prove that this
is a Potential game and we analytically find the Nash equilib-
ria, (iv) we introduce the concept of the neutral operator who
represents the system/state regulator or the minimum users
requirement, and (v) we discuss different regulation methods
and analyze their efficacy, implications and the resources that
are required for their implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we introduce the system model and in Section III we analyze
the dynamics of the users interaction and find the stationary
point of the market. In Section IV we define and solve the
price competition game among the operators and in Section V
we discuss the relation between the revenue of the operators
and the efficiency of the market and their dependency on the
system parameters. Accordingly, we analyze various regulation
methods for different regulation objectives and give related
numerical examples. We conclude in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless service market (hereafter referred to
as a market) with a very large set of users N = (1, 2, . . . , N)
and a set of operators I = (1, 2, . . . , I), which is depicted
in Figure 2. We assume a time slotted operation. Each user
cannot be served by more than one operator simultaneously.
However, users can switch in each slot t between operators or
even they can opt to refrain and not purchase services from
anyone of the I operators. The net utility perceived by each
user who is served by operator i in time slot t is:
Ui(Wi, ni(t), λi) = Vi(Wi, ni(t))− λi (1)
where ni(t) are the users served by this specific operator in
slot t, Wi the total spectrum at his disposal, and λi the charged
price. In order to describe the market operation we introduce
the users vector x(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xI(t), x0(t)), where
the ith component xi(t) = ni(t)/N represents the portion of
users that have selected operator i ∈ I. Additionally, with
x0(t) = n0(t)/N we denote the portion of users that have
selected neither of the I operators. We assume that the number
of users N is very large, N >> 1 and therefore the variable
xi(t) = ni(t)/N is considered continuous. In other words,
we assume that there exist a continuum of users partitioned
among the different operators.
1) Valuation function: The function Vi(·) represents the
value of the offered service for each user associated with
operator i ∈ I. Users are considered homogeneous: all the
users served by a certain operator are charged the same price
and perceive the same utility. We consider the following
particular valuation function:
Vi(Wi, xi(t)) = log
Wi
Nxi(t)
, xi(t) > 0 (2)
Since N is given, we use xi(t) instead of ni(t). This function
has the following desirable properties: (i) the valuation for
each user decreases with the total number of served users by
the specific operator due to congestion, (ii) increases with the
amount of available spectrum Wi, and (iii) it is a concave
function and therefore captures the saturation of the user
satisfaction as the allocated resource increases, i.e. it satisfies
the principle of diminishing marginal returns, [6].
A basic assumption in our model is that users served by
the same operator are allocated an equal amount of resource.
We want to stress that this assumption captures many different
settings in wireline, [1], or wireless networks, [4], [5], [14],
[15], [18]. Some examples where the equal resource sharing
assumption holds are the following:
• FDMA - TDMA: If the operator uses a multiple ac-
cess scheme like Frequency Division Multiple Access
(FDMA) or Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA),
then the equal resource sharing assumption holds by
default, [5]. The users served by a certain operator receive
an equal share of his total available spectrum or an equal
time share of the operator’s channel.
• CSMA/CA: A similar result holds for the Carrier Sense
Multiple Access scheme with Collision Avoidance, [16],
that is used in IEEE 802.11 protocols. Users trying to
access the channel receive an equal share of it and achieve
- on average - the same transmission rate. Additionally,
as it was shown in [17], even if the radio transmitters
are controlled by selfish users, they can achieve this fair
resource sharing.
• Random access of multiple channels: Even in more
complicated access schemes as in the case, for example,
where many different users iteratively select the least
congested channel among a set of available channels, it
is proved that each user receives asymptotically an equal
share of the channel bandwidth, [18].
Additionally, the macroscopic perspective and the large time
scale that we consider in this problem , ensure that spatiotem-
poral variations in the quality of the offered services will be
smoothed out due to load balancing and other similar network
management techniques that the operators employ. Therefore,
users of each operator are treated in equal terms.
2) Neutral Operator: Variable x0(t) represents the portion
of users that do not select anyone of the I operators. Namely,
a user in each time slot t is willing to pay operator i ∈ I
only if the offered utility Ui(Wi, xi(t), λi) is greater than a
threshold U0 ≥ 0. If all operators fail to satisfy this minimum
requirement then the user abstains from the market and is
associated with the Neutral Operator P0, Figure 2. In other
words, P0 represents the choice of selecting neither of the
I operators and receiving utility of U0 units. Technically, as
it will be shown in the sequel, the inclusion of P0 affects
both the user decision process for selecting operator and the
competition among the operators.
From a modeling perspective, the neutral operator may be
used to represent different realistic aspects of the wireless
service market. First, P0 can be an actual operator owned by
the state, as the public/municipal WiFi provider we considered
in the introductory example. In this case, through the gratis U0
service, the state intervenes and regulates the market as we
will explain in Section V. Additionally, U0 can be indirectly
imposed by the state (the regulator) through certain rules such
as the minimum amount of spectrum/rate per user. Finally, it
can represent the users reluctancy to pay very high prices for
poor QoS, similarly to the individual rationality constraint in
mechanism design. We take these realistic aspects into account
and moreover, by using x0(t), we find precisely how many
users are not satisfied by the market of the I operators.
Unlike the valuation Vi(·) of the service offered by each
operator i ∈ I, U0 is considered constant. When U0 represents
users minimum requirements or respective restrictions im-
posed by regulatory rules, this assumption follows directly and
actually is imperative. In case U0 models the service offered
by the neutral operator (e.g. the municipal WiFi network),
the constant value of U0 means that it is independent of the
number of users and hence non-congestible. We follow this
assumption for the following two reasons:(i) U0 is a free of
charge service which in general is low and hence can be
ensured for a large number of users. (ii) The state agency
(i.e. the regulator) who provides U0, is able to increase his
resource in order to ensure a constant value for U0. As we
will explain in next sections, this latter aspect captures the
cost of regulation, i.e. the cost of serving users through the
neutral operator. Finally, notice that our model can be easily
extended for the case that U0 is a congestible service.
3) Revenue: Each operator i ∈ I determines the price
λi ∈ R+ that he will charge to his clients. The decisions
of the operators are realized in a different time scale than the
decisions of the users. Namely, each operator i determines his
price in the beginning of each time epoch T which consists of
T slots, while users update their operator association decision
in each slot. Let us define the price vector λ = (λi : i =
1, 2, . . . , I) and the vector of the I−1 prices of operators other
than i as λ−i = (λj : j ∈ I \ i). We assume that T is large
enough so that for each price vector λ set at the beginning of
an epoch, the market of the users reaches a stationary point -
if such a point is attainable - during this epoch. The objective
of each operator i ∈ I is to maximize his revenue during each
epoch T :
Ri(xi(t), λi) = λixi(t)N (3)
In these markets there are no service level agreements (SLAs)
or any other type of QoS guarantees and hence the operators
are willing to admit and serve as many users as it is required
to achieve their goal.
III. USER STRATEGY AND MARKET DYNAMICS
A. Evolutionary Game GU among Users
In order to select the optimal operator that maximizes eq.
(1), each user must be aware of all system parameters, i.e.
the spectrum Wi, the number of served users ni and the
charged price λi for each i ∈ I. However, in realistic settings
this information will not be available in advance. Given these
restrictions and the large number of users, we model their
interaction and the operator selection process by defining an
evolutionary game, GU , as follows:
• Players: the set of the N users, N = (1, 2, . . . , N).
• Strategies: each user selects a certain operator i ∈ I or
the neutral operator P0.
• Population State: the users distribution over the
I operators and the neutral operator, x(t) =
(x1(t), x2(t), . . . , xI(t), x0(t)).
• Payoff: the user’s net utility Ui(Wi, xi(t), λi) when he
selects operator i ∈ I, or U0 when he selects P0.
To facilitate our analysis we make the following assump-
tions:
• Assumption 1: The number of users N is very large,
N >> 1 and therefore the variable xi(t) = ni(t)/N is
considered continuous.
• Assumption 2: The initial distribution of users over the
I operators is non zero: xi(0) > 0, ∀i ∈ I. It directly
follows that x0(0) < 1.
In the sequel we explain how each user selects his strategy
under this limited information and what is the outcome of this
game.
B. User Strategy Update
A basic component of every evolutionary game is the revi-
sion protocol, [3]. It captures the dynamics of the interaction
among the users and describes in detail the process according
to which a player iteratively updates his strategy. There exist
many different options for the revision protocol, depending
on the modeling assumptions of the specific problem. These
assumptions are mainly related to how sophisticated, informed
and rational are the players. On the one extreme, fully rational
and informed players update their choices according to a best
response strategy like in the typical (non-evolutionary) strate-
gic games. This means that players make a direct selection
of the best available strategy. On the other extreme, players
follow an imitation strategy. In this case a player (A) selects
randomly another player (B) and if the utility of the latter
is higher, (A) imitates his strategy with a probability that
is proportional to the anticipated utility improvement. This
modeling option is suitable for imperfectly informed players,
or players with bounded rationality who update their strategy
based on a better (instead of best) response strategy. Between
these two extremes, there are many different options. For
example, a player may update his strategy with a hybrid
protocol based partially on imitation and on direct selection,
[3].
In this work, we assume that each user updates his strategy
by a special type of hybrid revision protocol which is a com-
bination of imitation of other users associated with operators
from the set I (market operators) and direct selection of the
neutral operator P0. The imitation component captures the lack
of information users have at their disposal about the market.
On the other hand, each user is aware of the exact value of
U0 and hence this choice is always available through direct
selection. Notice that the considered revision protocol is not
a typical hybrid protocol since the direct selection is related
only to the selection of P0 and not to the other operators.
In detail, the proposed revision protocol can be described
by the following actions that each user may take in each slot
t:
1) A user associated with an operator i ∈ I, selects ran-
domly another user who is associated with an operator
j ∈ I, j 6= i, and if Uj > Ui imitates his strategy
with a probability that is proportional to the difference
(Uj − Ui).
2) A user associated with the neutral operator P0, selects
randomly another user associated with operator j ∈ I
and if Uj > U0, imitates his strategy with a probability
that is proportional to the difference (Uj − U0).
3) A user associated with operator i ∈ I selects the neutral
operator P0 with probability that is proportional to the
difference (U0 − Ui).
Options 1 and 2, stem from the replicator dynamics introduced
by Taylor and Jonker in [10] and are based on imitation of
users with better strategies. On the other hand, option 3 is
based on direct selection of better strategies, known also as
pairwise dynamics, introduced by Smith in [23].
After defining the revision protocol, we can calculate the
rate at which users switch from one strategy (operator) to
another strategy (operator). In particular, the switch rate of
users migrating from operator i to operator j ∈ I \ i in time
slot t, is:
ρij(t) = xj(t)[Uj(t)− Ui(t)]+ (4)
where xj(t) is the portion of users already associated with
operator j. For simplicity, we express the user utilities as a
function with a single argument, the time t. Additionally, the
users switch rate from operator i to neutral operator P0, is:
ρi0(t) = γ[U0 − Ui(t)]+ (5)
Notice the difference between imitation and direct selection
[3]. Instead of multiplying the utilities difference with the
population x0(t), we use a constant multiplier γ ∈ R. This
is due to the model assumption that switching to the neutral
operator is not accomplished through imitation and hence does
not depend on the portion of users already been associated with
P0. The probabilistic aspect captures the bounded rationality,
the inertia of the users and other similar realistic aspects of
these markets. Finally, the switch rate of users leaving P0 and
returning to the market (option 2) is:
ρ0i(t) = xi(t)[Ui(t)− U0]+ (6)
Variables ρij , ρi0 and ρ0i represent the rates at which
users migrate from one operator to another, including the
neutral operator P0. It is interesting to notice that if these
rates are normalized properly, they can be interpreted as the
probabilities with which users update their operator selection
strategy. This approach is discussed in [3]. In the sequel we
use these rates to derive the ordinary differential equations
(ODE) that describe the evolution of the population of users.
C. Market Stationary Points
The new type of hybrid revision protocol introduced above,
results in user market dynamics that cannot be expressed with
the known differential equations of replicator dynamics or
other similar scheme, [3]. In Section A of the Appendix we
prove that the mean dynamics of the system are:
dxi(t)
dt
= xi(t)[Ui(t)− Uavg(t)− x0(t)(Ui(t)− U0) (7)
− γ(U0 − Ui(t))+ + x0(t)(Ui(t)− U0)+], ∀i ∈ I
where Uavg(t) =
∑
i∈I xi(t)Ui(t) is the average utility of the
market in each slot t. The user population associated with P0
is:
dx0(t)
dt
= x0
∑
i∈I+
xi(U0 − Ui) + γ
∑
j∈I−
xj(U0 − Uj) (8)
where I+ is the subset of operators offering utility Ui(t) > U0,
and I− is the subset of operators offering utility Ui(t) < U0,
at slot t.
The important thing is that despite its different evolution,
as we prove in Section B, this system has the same stationary
points as the systems that are described by the classical
replicator dynamic equations:
x˙i(t) = 0⇒ xi(t)[Ui(t)− Uavg(t)] = 0, ∀i ∈ I (9)
and
x˙0(t) = 0⇒ x0(t)[U0 − Uavg(t)] = 0 (10)
The user state vector x∗ and the respective user utility U∗i , i ∈
I, that satisfy these stationary conditions can be summarized
in the following 3 cases:
• Case A: x∗i , x∗0 > 0 and U∗i = U0, i ∈ I.
• Case B: x∗i , x∗j > 0, x∗0 = 0 and U∗i = U∗j , with
U∗i , U
∗
j > U0, ∀ i, j ∈ I.
• Case C: x∗i , x∗j > 0, x∗0 = 0 and U∗i = U∗j = U0,
∀ i, j ∈ I.
Case A corresponds to the scenario where all operators offer
to their clients net utility which is equal to the value of the
service offered by the neutral operator. On the other hand,
in case B the market operators offer higher utility than the
neutral operator and hence all users are served by the market.
Finally, in case C, the I operators offer marginal services, i.e.
equal to U0, but they have attracted all the users.
It is interesting to compare the above results with the
Wardrop model and the Wardrop equilibrium, [20]. The market
stationary points for Case A and Case C satisfy the Wardrop
first principle and yield an equilibrium where the available
strategy options (”operators” in our problem) result in equal
utility for the players (”users”). However, this does not hold
for Case B where operators other than P0 offer higher utility.
This emerges due to the fact that the alternative option (or
reservation utility) is non-congestible, i.e. independent of x0.
The evolutionary game allows us to provide a richer model
than the typical Wardrop model and more importantly to
capture the users interaction and dynamics.
Before calculating the stationary point x∗ for each case,
and in order to facilitate our analysis, we define the scalar
parameter αi = Wi/(NeU0) for each operator i ∈ I and
the respective vector α = (αi : i = 1, 2, . . . , I). As it will
be explained in the sequel, these parameters determine the
operators and users interaction and will help us to explain the
role of the regulator. We can find the stationary points for Case
A by using equation Ui(Wi, x∗i , λi) = U0 and imposing the
constraint x∗0 > 0. Apparently, the state vector x∗ depends on
the price vector λ. Therefore, we define the set of all possible
Case A stationary points, XA, as follows (see Section B for
details):
XA =
{
x∗i = αie
−λi , ∀i ∈ I, x∗0 = 1−
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi : λ ∈ ΛA
}
TABLE I
WIRELESS SERVICE MARKET STATIONARY POINTS.
XA XB XC
x∗i αie
−λi αi
eλi
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj
αie
−λi
x∗
0
1−
∑I
i=1 αie
−λi 0 0
Cond. λ ∈ ΛA λ ∈ ΛB λ ∈ ΛC
where ΛA is the set of prices for which a stationary point in
XA is attainable, i.e. for which it holds x∗0 > 0:
ΛA =
{
(λ1, λ2, . . . , λI) :
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi < 1
}
Recall that due to the very large number of users, we consider
xi a continuous variable.
Similarly, for Case B, we calculate the stationary points by
using the set of equations Ui(Wi, x∗i , λi) = Uj(Wj , x∗j , λj),
∀ i, j ∈ I:
XB =
{
x∗i =
αi
eλi
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj
, ∀i ∈ I, x∗0 = 0 : λ ∈ ΛB
}
where ΛB is the set of prices for which a stationary point in
XB is feasible, i.e. U∗i > U0:
ΛB =
{
(λ1, λ2, . . . , λI) :
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi > 1
}
Finally, the stationary points for the Case C solution must
satisfy the constraint
∑I
i=1 αie
−λi = 1 which yields:
XC =
{
x∗i = αie
−λi , ∀ i ∈ I, x∗0 = 0 : λ ∈ ΛC
}
with
ΛC =
{
(λ1, λ2, . . . , λI) :
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi = 1
}
Notice that the stationary point sets XA, XB and XC and the
respective price sets, ΛA, ΛB , and ΛC depend on the vector
α. These results are summarized in Table I. For each oper-
ators price profile λ, the evolutionary game admits a unique
stationary point x∗ = (x∗1, x∗2, . . . , x∗I , x∗0) which belongs in
the respective set XA, XB , or XC . The utility of the users is
equal to U0 for the Case A and Case C, while for Case B it
depends on λ.
1) Stability of Stationary Points: Now that we found the
stationary points of the hybrid revision protocol, it is important
to characterize their stability. We prove in the sequel that these
points are Evolutionary Stable Strategies (ESS) and hence they
are locally asymptotically stable, i.e. stable within a limited
region. ESS and replicator dynamics are the two concepts used
for studying evolutionary games. Unlike the replicator dynam-
ics, ESS is a static concept which requires that the strategy
of players in the equilibrium is stable when it is invaded by a
small population of players playing a different strategy, [22].
When the players population is homogeneous, as we assumed
in our model, an ESS is stable in the replicator dynamic, but
not every stable steady state is an ESS. Additionally, every
ESS is Nash, and hence ESS is a refinement of the Nash
equilibrium.
Let us first give a simple definition of the ESS, tailored to
our system model. Assume that the users market has reached
the stationary state described by vector x∗. Suppose now that a
small portion ǫ > 0 of the users population deviates from their
decision in the stationary state (i.e. selects another operator)
and selects another operator j ∈ I or the neutral operator.
This yields a new distribution of users which we denote by
xǫ = (x
ǫ
1, x
ǫ
2, . . . , x
ǫ
I , x
ǫ
0). We say that x∗ is an ESS if (i) users
that deviate from x∗ receive lower utility in the new system
state xǫ or, (ii) the utility of the deviating users in xǫ is the
same as in the previous state x∗, but the utility of the legitimate
users (those insisting in their initial decisions) is higher in xǫ
than in x∗. In both cases, the deviating users worsen their
obtained utility. The stationary points derived above satisfy
these conditions and hence they are ESS.
In detail, assume that the system has a stationary point
x
∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, . . . , x
∗
I , x
∗
0) ∈ XB , with x∗0 = 0. Suppose that a
user who is associated with operator i ∈ I deviates and selects
another operator j ∈ I. In this case, the population of users in
operator i decreases, xǫi < x∗i and the population of users in
operator j increases, xǫj > x∗j . Initially, these two operators
offered identical utility, Ui(Wi, x∗i , λi) = Uj(Wj , x∗j , λj)
but after the decision of the deviating user it becomes
Ui(Wi, x
ǫ
i , λi) > Uj(Wj , x
ǫ
j , λj). Clearly, the deviating user
obtains less utility and hence there is no incentive to deviate.
Similarly, if a user deviates and selects the neutral operator,
he will receive reduced utility since when x∗ ∈ XB , it is
U∗i > U0, ∀i ∈ I.
Assume now that the system attains a stationary point x∗ ∈
XA. Similarly to the previous analysis, it is straightforward
that a user who deviates from x∗ and moves from an operator
i ∈ I to another operator j ∈ I will decrease his utility. If
the user migrates to the neutral operator, his utility will not be
reduced because U0 is constant (non-congestible). However,
in this case, the users that will insist in their initial choice of
operator i will now receive higher utility due to the move of the
deviator. Due to the ESS definition and specifically according
to Smith’s second condition, [24], this is not a preferable
choice for the deviator and hence x∗ ∈ XB is an ESS.
Finally, when x∗ ∈ XC , user deviation from a market
operator i ∈ I to another market operator j ∈ I or to P0
is not beneficial for the deviator, either because it decreases
his utility or because it increases the utility of other users.
In conclusion, the stationary points of the proposed revision
protocol are ESS equilibriums and hence locally stable.
IV. PRICE COMPETITION AMONG OPERATORS
In the previous section we analyzed the stationary points
of users interaction and showed that they depend on the
prices selected by the operators. Each operator anticipates the
users strategy and chooses accordingly for each epoch T the
price that maximizes his revenue. This gives rise to a non-
cooperative price competition game GP among the operators
that is played in the beginning of each time epoch T . We
assume that operators are aware of the parameters of the users
market and also know the values of parameters αi, i ∈ I
and U0. Specifically, we model the operators competition as
a static simultaneous move normal form game of complete
information, following the Bertrand competition model [6].
We are interested not only in finding the Nash equilibriums
(NE) of this game but also to understand if and how the game
converges to them.
We prove that GP is a potential game and hence if it
is played in many rounds and operators choose their prices
based on the previous prices of the other operators, the game
converges to a NE. In other words, we analyze the dynamics
induced by the repeated play of the same game assuming
that operators follow simple myopic rules. We show that
the equilibrium of the competition game depends on vector
α and the value of U0. For certain combinations of these
parameters, the game admits a unique equilibrium while for
other combinations, it reaches one of the infinitely many
equilibriums depending on the initial prices.
A. Price Competition Game GP
Before analyzing this game, it is important to emphasize
that the revenue function depends on the price vector λ. In
particular, using equation (3), we can calculate the revenue of
operator i when λ ∈ ΛA, when λ ∈ ΛB , and when λ ∈ ΛC ,
denoted as RAi (·), RBi (·) and RCi (·) respectively:
RAi (λi) = R
C
i (λi) = αiλiNe
−λi (11)
and
RBi (λi, λ−i) =
αiλiN
eλi
∑I
i=1 αie
−λi
(12)
RAi (·) and RCi (·) depend only on the price selected by operator
i, while RBi (·) depends on the entire price vector λ. However,
in all cases, the price set (ΛA, ΛB or ΛC) to which the price
vector λ = (λi, λ−i) belongs, is determined jointly by all the
I operators.
Let us now define the non-cooperative Pricing Game
among the I operators, GP = (I, {λi}, {Ri}):
• The set of Players is the set of the I operators I =
(1, 2, . . . , I).
• The strategy space of each player i is its price λi ∈
[0, λmax], λmax ∈ R+, and the strategy profile is the
price vector λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λI) of the operators.
• The payoff function of each player is his revenue Ri :
(λi, λ−i)→R, where Ri = RAi or RBi or RCi .
The particular characteristic of this game is that each operator
has 2 different payoff functions depending on the price profile.
Despite this characteristic, the payoff function is continuous
and quasi-concave as we prove in the Appendix, Section C.
In the sequel, we analyze the best response of each operator
which constitutes a reaction curve to the prices set by the other
operators. The equilibrium of the game GP is the intersection
of the reaction curves of the operators.
B. Best Response Strategy of Operators
The best response of each operator i, λ∗i , to the prices
selected by the other I−1 operators, λ−i, depends on the users
market stationary point. Notice that for certain λ−i, operator
i may be able to select a price such that (λi, λ−i) belongs to
any price set (ΛA, ΛB or ΛC ) while for some λ−i the operator
choice will be restricted in two or even a single price set.
Best Response when λ ∈ ΛA: If the I−1 operators j ∈ I\i
select such prices, λ−i, that the market stationary point is
x
∗ ∈ XA, then operator i finds the price λ∗i that maximizes
his revenue RAi (·) by solving the following constrained opti-
mization problem (PAi ):
max
λi≥0
αiλiNe
−λi (13)
s.t.
I∑
j=1
αje
−λj < 1 (14)
The objective function of this problem is quasi-concave,
[25]. However, the constraint defines an open set and hence
uniqueness of optimal solution is not ensured. To overcome
this obstacle we substitute constraint eq. (14) with the closed
set:
λi ≥ log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
+ ǫ (15)
where ǫ > 0 is an arbitrary small constant number. This
inequality stems from eq. (14) by solving for λi and adding
ǫ. It does not affect the problem definition and formulation
nor the obtained results since, as we will prove in the sequel,
operators do not select a price in the lower bound of the
constraint set. After this transformation the problem has a
unique optimal solution which is equal to the solution of the
respective unconstrained problem, λ∗i = 1, if (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA.
Best Response when λ ∈ ΛB: Similarly, when λ−i is such
that operator i can select a price λ∗i with (λ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB , then
his revenue is given by the function RBi (·) and is maximized
by the solution of problem (PBi ):
max
λi≥0
λiαiN
eλi
∑
j∈I αje
−λj
(16)
s.t.
I∑
j=1
αje
−λj > 1 (17)
This is also a concave problem which would have a unique
solution if the constraint set was closed and compact. Again,
we substitute the constraint with the (almost) equivalent in-
equality:
λi ≤ log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
− ǫ (18)
Now, the problem has a unique solution which coincides with
the solution of the respective unconstrained problem, denoted
µ∗i , if (µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB as we explain in detail in Section D.
Best Response when λ ∈ ΛC: In this special case, the price
of each operator i is directly determined by the prices that the
other operators have selected. Namely, given the vector λ−i,
each operator i has only one feasible solution (otherwise λ
does not belong to ΛC ):
λ∗i = log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
(19)
Whether each operator i will agree and adopt this price or not,
depends on the respective accrued revenue RCi (λ∗i , λ−i).
We can summarize the best response price strategy of each
operator i ∈ I, by defining his revenue function as follows:
Ri(λi, λ−i, α) =
{
αiλiN∑I
j=1 αje
λi−λj
if λi < l0,
αiλiNe
−λi if λi ≥ l0.
(20)
where l0 = log(αi/(1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj )). Clearly, the optimal
price λ∗i depends both on the prices of the other operators λ−i
and on parameters αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , I:
λ∗i = argmax
λi
Ri(λi, λ−i, α) (21)
where α = (α1, α2, . . . , αI). Clearly, each operator needs to
know the vector α and to be able to observe the other operators
prices in order to calculate his best response.
For each possible price vector λ−i of the I \ i operators,
operator i will solve all the above optimization problems and
find the solution that yields the highest revenue. In Section
D we prove that this results in the following best response
strategy:
λ∗i (λ−i, α) =


1 if (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA,
µ∗i if (µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB,
l0 otherwise.
(22)
These options are mutually exclusive. Moreover, if∑
j 6=i αj/e
λj ≥ 1, the only feasible response is λ∗i = µ∗i .
The dependence of λ∗i on parameters αi = Wi/(NeU0),
i = 1, 2, . . . , I , has interesting implications and brings into
the fore the role of the regulator. Finally, observe that the
transformation of the constraint set of problems PAi and PBi
did not affect the best response strategy of operator i since
he only selects the solution of the respective unconstrained
problems.
C. Equilibrium Analysis of GP
The price competition game GP is a finite ordinal potential
game and therefore not only has pure Nash equilibria but
also the players can reach them under any best response
strategy. That is, if we consider that GP is played repeatedly
by the operators who update their strategy with a myopic best
response method, we can show that the convergence to the
equilibriums is ensured under any finite improvement path
(FIP), [12]. The potential function is:
P(λ) =
{∑I
j=1[logλj − λj ], if
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj ≤ 1,∑I
j=1[logλj − λj ]− log (
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj ), else.
The detailed proof is given in Section E. In order to find the
NE we solve the system of equations (22), i = 1, 2, . . . , I and
TABLE II
EQUILIBRIUMS OF I OPERATORS COMPETITION FOR DIFFERENT VALUES
OF α.
Prices/Rev. α ∈ A1 α ∈ A2 α ∈ A3
λ∗i 1 λi 6= λj
I
I−1
or λi = λj = log Iα
R∗i
αN
e
Ri 6= Rj
N
I−1
or Ri = Rj =
N
I
log Iα
x
∗ XA XC XB
specifically we use the iterated dominance method (Section
F).
The outcome of the game GU affects the strategy of opera-
tors and therefore the outcome of the game GP . A price vector
(λ∗i , λ
∗
−i) is an equilibrium of the game GP , parameterized by
the vector α = (α1, α2, . . . , αI), if it satisfies:
Ri(λ
∗
i , λ
∗
−i, α) ≥ Ri(λi, λ
∗
−i, α), ∀ i ∈ I, ∀λi ≥ 0, ∀x
∗
In order to simplify our study and focus on the results and
implications of our analysis, we assume that all operators have
the same amount of available spectrum Wi = W and therefore
it is also αi = α, ∀i ∈ I.
The equilibrium of the price competition game and subse-
quently the market stationary point x∗, depend on the value
of α. These results are summarized in Table II and stem from
the following Theorem:
Theorem IV.1. The non-cooperative game GP where opera-
tors select their strategy in order to maximize their revenue,
converges to one of the following pure Nash equilibria:
• If α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I), there is a unique Nash Equilibrium
λ∗ ∈ ΛA, with λ∗ = (λ∗i = 1 : i = 1, 2, . . . , I) and the
respective unique market stationary point is x∗ ∈ XA.
• If α ∈ A3 = (e II−1 /I,∞), there is a unique Nash
Equilibrium λ∗ ∈ ΛB , with λ∗ = (λ∗i = II−1 : i =
1, 2, . . . , I), which induces a unique respective market
stationary point x∗ ∈ XB .
• If α ∈ A2 = [e/I, e II−1 /I], there exist infinitely many
equilibria, λ∗ ∈ ΛC , and each one of them yields a
respective market stationary point x∗ ∈ XC .
Proof: In Section E of the Appendix we provide the
detailed proof according to which GP is a potential game and
in Section F we use iterated strict dominance to find the Nash
equilibrium λ∗ which depends on parameter α.
In conclusion, GP is a non-cooperative game of complete
information that attains certain pure Nash equilibriums (NE)
which depend on parameters αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , I . It is proved to
be a potential game and hence the equilibriums can be reached
if GP is played repeatedly and operators update their strategy
by simple best response or other similar utility improvement
methods. If αi parameters are equal, i.e. αi = α, ∀i ∈ I, then
the NE is unique for α ∈ A1 or α ∈ A3. For the case α ∈ A2,
the reached equilibrium depends on the initial price vector.
V. MARKET OUTCOME AND REGULATION
The outcome of the users and operators interaction can
be characterized by the following two fundamental criteria:
the efficiency of the users market and the total revenue the
operators accrue. We show that both of them depend on
parameter α and we further explore the impact of W and
U0 on them. Accordingly, we analyze the problem from a
mechanism design perspective and explain how a regulator, as
the municipal WiFi provider in the introductory example, can
bias the market operation (outcome) by adjusting the value of
α. We consider different regulation methods and discuss their
implications.
A. Market Outcome and Regulation Criteria
1) Market Efficiency: A market is efficient if the users
enjoy high utilities in the stationary point. However, in certain
scenarios, the services provided by the P0 may impose an
additional cost to the system (e.g. the cost of the municipal
WiFi provider is borne by the citizens) and hence it would
be preferable to have all the users served by the I operators.
Therefore, we use the following two metrics to characterize
the efficiency of the market: (i) the aggregate utility (Uagg) of
users in the stationary point x∗, and (ii) the cost J0 = x0NU0
incurred by the neutral operator P0 for serving the portion x0
of the users. Both of these metrics depend on parameter α and
hence on system parameters W and U0.
In detail:
• When α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I), it is x∗ ∈ XA, which means
that a portion of users x∗0 > selects P0. The latter incurs
cost of J0 = x∗0NU0 units. All users receive utility of U0
units and hence the aggregate utility is Uagg = NU0.
• On the other hand, when α ∈ A2 = [e/I, eI/(I−1)/I],
it is x∗ ∈ XC . In this case, all users are served by the
I operators with marginal utility, i,e. U∗i = U0 for i =
1, 2, . . . , I . There is no cost for P0, i.e. J0 = 0. Again,
it is Uagg = NU0 but unlike the previous case, there is
no cost for P0.
• Finally, if α ∈ A3 = (eI/(I−1)/I,∞) it is x∗ ∈ XB . All
users are served by the I operators, i.e. x∗0 = 0 and J0 =
0, and receive high utilities U∗i > U0, i = 1, 2, . . . , I .
The welfare is higher in this case, i.e. Uagg > NU0.
In summary, the aggregate utility of the users changes with α
as follows:
Uagg =
{
NU0, if α ∈ A1 ∪ A2,
N(log(WIN )−
I
I−1 ), if α ∈ A3.
(23)
It can be easily verified that Uagg is a continuous function.
We have expressed Uagg in terms of W and U0 in order to
investigate the impact of the system parameters in the market.
When α ∈ A1∪A2, Uagg increases with U0 and is independent
of the spectrum W . On the contrary, when α ∈ A3, Uagg
increases with W and is independent of U0. Notice that when
the value of α changes from A1 to interval A2, Uagg remains
the same but the other metric of efficiency, the cost of neutral
operator J0, is improved:
J0 =
{
αINU0
e , if α ∈ A1,
0, if α ∈ A2 ∪ A3.
(24)
2) Revenue of Operators: When α lies in the interval A1,
the optimal prices are λ∗i = 1, ∀i ∈ I and all the operators
accrue the same revenue R∗i = αNe−1 = We−(U0+1), which
is proportional to α, increases with the available spectrum W ,
decreases with U0 and is independent of the number N of
users. In Figure 4 we depict the revenue of each operator for
different values of α, in a duopoly market. Notice that the
revenue increases linearly with α ∈ (0, e/2).
When α ∈ A2, the competition of the operators may attain
different equilibria, λ∗ ∈ ΛC , depending on the initial prices
and on the sequence the operators update their prices. In Figure
5 we present the revenue of two operators (duopoly) at the
equilibrium, for various initial prices and for α = e ∈ A2.
Here we assume that the 1st operator is able to set his price
λ1(0) before the 2nd operator. Also, in Figure 4 we illustrate
the dependence of the revenue of the operators on the value
of α when it lies in A2, given that λ1(0) = 1.1. For certain
prices, e.g. when λ1(0) = log 2α, both operators accrue the
same revenue at the equilibrium, R∗1 = R∗2 =
N log 2α
2 .
If α ∈ A3 = (eI/(I−1),∞) all operators set their prices to
λ∗i = I/(I − 1) and get R∗i = N/(I − 1) units, as shown
in Table II. Figure 6 depicts the competition of two operators
and the convergence to the respective Nash equilibria for α =
e3 ∈ A3. We assume that both operators have selected prices
λ1(0) = λ2(0) = log 2α ≈ 3.7. However, this price vector
does not constitute a NE and hence an operator (e.g. the 1st)
can temporarily increase his revenue by decreasing his price
to λ1 = 3. Accordingly, the other operator (2nd) will react
by reducing his price to λ2 = 2.5. Gradually, the competition
of the operators will converge to the NE where both of them
will set λ∗1 = λ∗2 = 2/(2 − 1) = 2 and will have revenue
R∗1 = R
∗
2 = 1. Interestingly, the revenue of both operators
in the equilibrium is lower than their initial revenue when
they did not compete. Finally, notice that, unlike the aggregate
utility Uagg, the revenue of the operators depends only on
α = W/(NeU0) and not the specific values of W and U0.
Before we proceed, let us summarize the above results:
• If α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I), it is R∗i = αNe−1 = We−(U0+1),
i = 1, 2, . . . , I . Operators receive equal revenue which is
(i) proportional to W , (ii) inversely proportional to U0
and (iii) independent of the number of users N .
• If α ∈ A2 = [e/I, e
I/(I−1)
I ), R
∗
i depends on the initial
prices operators select. In the particular case that a
single operator i sets first his price λi so as to be
λi(0) = log Iα, then all operators obtain finally equal
revenue R∗i =
N log Iα
I .
• If α ∈ A3 = [ e
I/(I−1)
I ,∞), it is R
∗
i =
N
I−1 . Operators
receive equal revenue which is (i) proportional to N , (ii)
independent of U0 and W .
Fig. 3. The regulator selects parameter α, the operators compete and select
the respective optimal prices λ∗i , and then, the users are divided among the
operators.
B. Regulation of the Wireless Service Market
Since both the market efficiency and the operator revenue
depend on α and system parameters W and U0, a regulating
agency can act as a mechanism designer and steer the outcome
of the market in a more desirable equilibrium according to
his objective. This can be achieved by determining directly
or indirectly (e.g. through pricing) the amount of spectrum
W each operator has at his disposal, or by intervening in
the market and setting the value U0 as the example with the
municipal WiFi Internet provider. This process is depicted in
Figure 3.
1) Regulating to Increase Market Efficiency: First, we
highlight the impact of parameters W and U0 on the efficiency
metrics. This is of crucial importance because tuning W or U0
has different implications for the regulator and the market. For
example, as it is explained below, the regulator can achieve
the same level of market efficiency either by selling more
spectrum to operators, e.g. by decreasing the spectrum price,
or by allocating more spectrum to the neutral operator:
• Assume that U0 is fixed. As the allocated spectrum W to
each operator increases, aggregate utility Uagg remains
constant until parameter α increases up to α ≥ e
I/(I−1)
I .
When α ∈ A3, Uagg is log-proportional to W . Also,
the cost J0 increases with W , as long as α ∈ A1, and
becomes zero for larger values of α.
• Assume that W is fixed. Uagg increases with U0 as long
as α ∈ A1 ∪ A2. For larger values of α, Uagg does not
depend directly on U0. Additionally, the cost J0 increases
with U0 as long as α ∈ A1 while for larger values of α
it becomes zero.
Let us now give a specific scenario for regulation. Assume
that initially α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I). Hence, a portion of users
is not served by anyone of the I operators, x∗0 > 1 and
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Fig. 4. The outcome of the operator competition (GP equilibrium) for
different values of parameter α, i.e. in different intervals.
all the users receive utility equal to U0. The regulator can
improve the market efficiency, i.e. increase Uagg and decrease
J0, by increasing the value of α. This can be achieved either
by increasing W or decreasing U0. Let us assume that the
regulator selects the first method. For example, he can change
the price of W and allow the operators to acquire more
spectrum. If W is increased until α = e/I , then the market
stationary point x∗ switches to XB . In this case, all users
are served by the market, x∗0 = 0, but they still receive only
marginal utility, Uagg = NU0. If the regulator provides even
more spectrum W to operators so as α > eI/(I−1)/I , then
x∗0 = 0 and moreover the users perceive higher utility because
Uagg increases proportional to logW , eq. (23). Obviously, the
improvement in market efficiency comes at the cost (opportu-
nity cost) of the additional spectrum the regulator must provide
to operators.
On the other hand, the regulator may prefer to directly in-
tervene in the market through P0 and tune U0. If U0 decreases,
the value of x∗0 decreases and users return to the market (to
the I operators). The portion of users x∗0 becomes zero when
α = e/I . This way, the cost of the regulator J0 decreases
(since P0 serves less users) but at the same time the aggregate
utility, Uagg = NU0, is also reduced. Namely, Uagg decreases
linearly with U0 until α = eI/(I−1)/I and remains constant
for larger values of U0, eq. (23). Again, the decision of the
regulator depends on his cost and on the efficiency he wants to
achieve. In conclusion, depending on they system parameters
(N, W, I) the efficiency of the market may be improved either
by increasing the resources of operators (sell more spectrum)
or by rendering highly competitive the services provided by
the neutral operator P0.
2) Regulating for Revenue: As illustrated in Table II, the
revenue of the operators increases proportionally to α for
α ∈ A1, and proportionally to logα for α ∈ A2, while
it remains constant when α ∈ A3. Notice that the revenue,
unlike the market efficiency, depends on the value of α and
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Fig. 5. The outcome of the competition of two operators, with α = e ∈ A2
and N = 1000. Operator 1 is assumed to set his price λ1(0) first. R∗1 and
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2
depend on λ1(0).
not on the specific combination of W and U0. These results
are presented in Figure 7 for a market with I = 3 operators
and N = 1000 users. In the upper plot, it is U0 = 0.1 and
the regulator increases the value of α by increasing W . The
aggregate utility is constant and equal to Uagg = NU0 = 100
for α < e3/(3−1)/3 ≈ 1.5 while it increases proportionally
to logW for α > 1.5. Obviously, increasing the spectrum of
operators improves both their revenue and the efficiency of the
market.
In the lower plot, the spectrum at the disposal of each
operator is constant, W = 5000, and the regulator increases
the value of α by decreasing U0. In this case, the total
revenue increases but at the expense of market efficiency.
When α ∈ A1 ∪ A2 = (0, e1.5/3], the aggregate utility Uagg
is reduced as U0 decreases but for α > e1.5/3 it remains
constant. Notice that for very small values of α, Uagg is large.
However, this desirable result comes at a cost for the regulator.
Namely, in this case only a small portion of users are served
by the market, while the rest of them select P0. Therefore, the
incurred cost J0 for the regulator is high.
Another interesting point in Figure 7 is the following. In
the upper subplot, for U0 = 0.1, the total operators revenue
is Rtot = 1500 units and the aggregate utility is Uagg = 100,
achieved by increasing the spectrum W until W = 1657.8
units, which yields α = 1.5. In the lower plot, the same total
revenue is reached for W = 5000, and decreasing U0 until
U0 = 1.204 units. In this case, the aggregate utility is Uagg =
1204 units. If, for example, the regulator is interesting only in
maximizing the revenue of operators, then he would prefer the
first method since it requires less spectrum and lower value
for U0.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the operators price competition in a
wireless services market where users have a certain reservation
utility U0. We modeled the users interaction as an evolutionary
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Fig. 6. Evolution of operator competition for α = e3 ∈ A3. The game is
played repeatedly and operators updated myopically their price based on the
previous strategy of the other operators.
game and the competition of the operators as a non cooperative
game of complete information. We proved that the latter
is a potential game and hence has pure Nash equilibriums.
The two games are realized in different time scale but they
are interrelated. Additionally, both of them depend on the
reservation utility U0 and the amount of spectrum W each
operator has at his disposal. Accordingly, we considered a
regulating agency and discussed how he can intervene and
change the outcome of the market by tuning either U0 or W .
Various regulation methods yield different market outcomes
and induce a different cost for the regulator.
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APPENDIX
A. Derivation of Evolutionary Dynamics
Here, we derive the new differential equations that describe
the evolution of the market of the users under the new
introduced revision protocol. Recall that, the latter is described
by the following equations:
ρij(t) = xj(t)[Uj(t)− Ui(t)]+, ∀i, j ∈ I (25)
ρi0(t) = γ[U0 − Ui(t)]+, ∀i ∈ I (26)
ρ0i(t) = xi(t)[Ui(t)− U0]+, ∀i ∈ I (27)
where ρij(t) is the rate at which users associated with operator
i switch to operator j in time slot t, ρi0(t) is the switch rate
from operator i to neutral operator P0 and ρ0i(t) the rate at
which users return from P0 to an operator i ∈ I in the market.
The constant value γ ∈ R+ represents the frequency of the
direct selection.
For imitation-based revision protocols, the dynamics of the
system can be described with the well-known replicator dy-
namics [3]. The hybrid revision protocol defined in equations
(25), (26) and (27) is in part imitation-based (ρij(t) and ρ0i(t))
and in part a probabilistic direct selection of the neutral oper-
ator (ρi0(t)). Therefore, the respective evolutionary dynamics
of the system cannot be described by the replicator dynamic
equations which correspond to the pure imitation mechanism.
We have to stress that the hybrid protocol that we introduce,
differs from the hybrid protocol in [3] in that users select
directly only the neutral operator and not the other I operators.
The portion of users xi who are associated with operator
i changes from time t to the time t + δt, according to the
following equation:
xi(t+ δt) = xi(t)− xi(t)δt
∑
j 6=0
xj(t)(Uj(t)− Ui(t))+
− xi(t)δtγ(U0(t)− Ui(t))+
+
I∑
j=0
δtxj(t)xi(t)(Ui(t)− Uj(t))+ (28)
for δt→ 0 we obtain the derivative:
dxi(t)
dt
= xi(t)[
∑
j 6=0
xj(t)Ui(t)−
∑
j 6=0
xj(t)Uj(t)
− γ(U0 − Ui)+ + x0(t)(Ui − U0)+]
or, if we omit the time index and rewrite the equation:
dxi(t)
dt
= xi[Ui − Uavg − x0(Ui − U0)− γ(U0 − Ui)+
+ x0(Ui − U0)+]
which can be analyzed in:
dxi(t)
dt
= xi(Ui − Uavg), ∀i ∈ I
+ (29)
dxj(t)
dt
= xj [Uj−Uavg−(γ−x0)(U0−Uj)], ∀j ∈ I
− (30)
where I+ is the set of operators offering utility Ui(t) ≥ U0,
and I− is the set of operators offering utility Uj(t) < U0.
The dynamics of the population x0 can be derived in a
similar way:
x0(t + δt) = x0(t)− x0(t)δt
∑
i6=0
xi(t)(Ui − U0)+
+
∑
i6=0
xi(t)δtγ(U0 − Ui)+ (31)
which can be written as:
dx0(t)
dt
= (x0
∑
i∈I+
xi(U0 − Ui) + γ
∑
j∈I−
xj(U0 − Uj)) (32)
Equations (29), (30) and (32) describe the evolutionary
dynamics of game GU .
B. Analysis of Stationary Points
Despite the different dynamics, the system reaches the same
stationary points as if users where employing the typical
imitation revision protocol. In detail, the market state vector
at a fixed point, x∗ = (x∗i , x∗j , x∗0: ∀ i ∈ I+, ∀ j ∈ I−), can
be found by the following set of equations:
dxi(t)
dt
=
dxj(t)
dt
=
dx0(t)
dt
= 0 ∀i ∈ I+, j ∈ I− (33)
Lemma A.1. The stationary points of the evolutionary dy-
namics defined in equations (29), (30) and (32) are identical
to the stationary points of the ordinary replicator dynamics
[3] given by:
x˙i(t) = 0⇒ xi(t)[Ui(t)− Uavg(t)] = 0, ∀ i ∈ I (34)
and
x˙0(t) = 0⇒ x0(t)[U0 − Uavg(t)] = 0 (35)
Proof: First we prove that, in any stationary point,
x∗j , j ∈ I
− should be equal to zero. We prove this claim by
contradiction. Assume that x∗j > 0. Since Uavg ≥ U0 > Uj ,
this implies that there should be at least one operator i with
Ui > Uavg and x∗i > 0. Therefore (Ui − Uavg) cannot be
equal to zero ∀i ∈ I+, and x˙i will be nonzero for at least one
operator. Therefore (33) cannot be satisfied, if x∗j 6= 0.
When xj = 0, the evolutionary dynamics given by eq. (29),
(30) and (32) reduce to ordinary replicator dynamics:
x˙i(t) = xi(t)[Ui(t)− Uavg(t)] ∀i ∈ I
x˙0(t) = x0(t)[U0 − Uavg(t)] (36)
Stationary points are identical to the stationary points of the
typical replicator dynamics, [3].
Due to this lemma, the stationary points for the users
population associated with each operator i ∈ I should satisfy
one of the following conditions: (i) x∗i = 0, or (ii) x∗i > 0
and U∗i = Uavg. Similarly, for the neutral operator P0, eq.
(35), it must hold: (i) x∗0 = 0 and U0 < Uavg , (ii) x∗0 > 0
and U0 = Uavg or (iii) x∗0 = 0 and U0 = Uavg . The case
x∗i = 0 implies zero revenue for the ith operator and hence
case (i) does not constitute a valid choice. Therefore, there
exist in total 3 possible combinations (cases) that will satisfy
the stationarity properties given by eq. (34) and (35):
• Case A: x∗i , x∗0 > 0 and U∗i = U0, i ∈ I.
• Case B: x∗i , x∗j > 0, x∗0 = 0 and U∗i = U∗j , with
U∗i , U
∗
j > U0, ∀ i, j ∈ I.
• Case C: x∗i , x∗j > 0, x∗0 = 0 and U∗i = U∗j = U0,
∀ i, j ∈ I.
We find now the exact value of the market state vector at
the equilibrium (stationary point) x∗ for each case. First, we
define for every operator i ∈ I the scalar parameter αi =
Wi/(Ne
U0) and the respective vector α = (αi : i ∈ I).
We can find the stationary points for Case A by using the
equation Ui(Wi, x∗i , λi) = U0 and imposing the constraint
x∗0 > 0:
Ui(Wi, x
∗
i , λi) = log
Wi
Nx∗i
− λi = U0 (37)
⇒ x∗i =
Wi
Neλi+U0
= αie
−λi
and
x∗0 > 0⇒ 1−
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi > 0⇒
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi < 1 (38)
Apparently, the state vector x∗ depends on the operators’ price
vector λ. Therefore, we define the set of all possible Case A
stationary points, XA, as follows:
XA =
{
x∗i = αie
−λi , ∀i ∈ I, x∗0 = 1−
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi : λ ∈ ΛA
}
where ΛA is the set of prices for which a stationary point in
XA is reachable, i.e. x∗0 > 0:
ΛA =
{
(λ1, λ2, . . . , λI) :
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi < 1
}
Similarly, for Case B, we calculate the stationary points by
using the set of equations Ui(Wi, x∗i , λi) = Uj(Wj , x∗j , λj),
∀ i, j ∈ I, which yields:
log
W1
Nx∗1
−λ1 = log
W2
Nx∗2
−λ2 = . . . = log
Wi
Nx∗i
−λi (39)
or, equivalently:
x∗j = x
∗
i
eλiαj
eλjαi
∀i, j ∈ I (40)
Moreover since x∗0 = 0 for Case B, the following holds:∑
i∈I
x∗i = 1 (41)
Using (40) and (41),
x∗i =
αi
eλi
∑
j∈I αje
−λj
(42)
Additionally, Ui > U0 implies that:
log
Wi
Nx∗i
− λi > U0 ⇒ x
∗
i < αie
−λi (43)
Using (41) and (43),
I∑
i=1
x∗i <
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi ⇒
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi > 1 (44)
Therefore, according to (42) and (44), we define the set of all
possible Case B stationary points, XB , as follows:
XB =
{
x∗i =
αi
eλi
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj
, ∀i ∈ I, x∗0 = 0 : λ ∈ ΛB
}
where ΛB is the set of prices for which a stationary point in
XB is feasible, U∗i > U0:
ΛB =
{
(λ1, λ2, . . . , λI) :
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi > 1
}
Finally, the stationary points for the Case C solution must
satisfy the following:
Ui = U0, x
∗
0 = 0 (45)
which yields:
x∗i = αie
−λi ,
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi = 1 (46)
Therefore, we define the set of all possible Case C stationary
points, XC , as follows:
XC =
{
x∗i = αie
−λi , ∀ i ∈ I, x∗0 = 0 : λ ∈ ΛC
}
with
ΛC =
{
(λ1, λ2, . . . , λI) :
I∑
i=1
αie
−λi = 1
}
First, we show that the revenue of each operator i ∈ I
is a continuous and a quasi-concave function. Secondly, we
analyze best response pricing in game GP . Then, we derive
the Nash equilibriums (NEs) of the game using iterated strict
dominance. Finally, we prove convergence to these equilibri-
ums by showing that GP is a potential game.
C. Properties of the Revenue Function
The revenue function of each operator i is given by the
following equation:
Ri(λi, λ−i) =


αiλiN
eλi
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj
if λi < l0,
αiλiNe
−λi if λi ≥ l0.
(47)
where l0 = log(αi/(1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj )).
Each component (for each case) is a positive function which
is also log-concave. This means that it is a quasiconcave
function and hence uniqueness of optimal solution is ensured
for a proper constraint set. Namely, it is:
fA(λi) = logαiλiNe
−λi = logαiλiN − λi (48)
and
fA(λi)
(1) =
1
λi
− 1⇒ fA(λi)
(2) =
−1
λ2i
< 0 (49)
Hence, fA(·) which is the log-function of RAi (·), is concave
which means that the later is log-concave and since it is
RAi (λi) > 0, it is also quasi-concave. Similarly, for the other
component of the revenue function:
fB(λi, λ−i) = log
αiλiN
αi + βeλi
= logαiλiN − logαi + βe
λi
(50)
where β =
∑
j 6=i αje
−λi
. The second derivative is:
fB(λi, λ−i)
(2) =
−1
λ2i
−
αiβe
λi
(αi + βeλi)2
< 0 (51)
Hence, RBi (·) is also quasiconcave. Finally, it is easy to see
that the function is continuous:
RAi (l0, λ−i) = R
B
i (l0, λ−i) = N(1− β) log
αi
1− β
(52)
D. Best Response Pricing in GP
Each operator i finds his best response price λ∗i for each
price profile of the other I − 1 operators by solving the
following optimization problems. For the case the price vector
belongs to the set ΛA, λ ∈ ΛA, (PAi ):
max
λi≥0
αiλiNe
−λi (53)
s.t.
I∑
j=1
αje
−λj < 1 (54)
In order to ensure the uniqueness of the problem solution, we
transform the constraint set to a closed and compact set as
follows:
λi ≥ log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
+ ǫ (55)
where ǫ > 0 is an arbitrary small positive constant number. As
we will show immediately this transformation of the constraint
set does not affect the solution of the game. The problem now
is quasi-concave with a closed and compact constraint set and
hence it has a unique optimal solution, [25] which we denote
λAi and it is:
λAi = 1, orλ
A
i = log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
+ ǫ (56)
The value λAi = 1 is the optimal solution of the respective
unconstrained problem, which yields optimal revenue RAi =
αN/e, and it is feasible if λ = (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA. Otherwise,
since RAi (·) is a decreasing function of λi, operator i can
only select the minimum price λAi such that (λAi , λ−i) ∈ ΛA.
Similarly, when the price vector belongs to the set ΛB , i.e.
λ ∈ ΛB , the revenue maximization problem for each operator
i ∈ I (PBi ) is:
max
λi≥0
λiαiN
eλi
∑
j∈I αje
−λj
(57)
s.t. ∑
j∈I
αje
−λj > 1 (58)
Similarly to the previous analysis, we transform the constraint
set to a closed and compact set by using the following
inequality:
λi ≤ log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
− ǫ (59)
This is also a concave problem which has unique solution and
can be either the optimal solution of the respective uncon-
strained problem, λ∗i if (λ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB , or the maximum price
for which the price vector belongs to ΛB (RBi (·) increases with
λi:
λBi = µ
∗
i , orλ
B
i = log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
− ǫ (60)
Finally, for the special case that λ ∈ ΛC , the price of each
operator i is directly determined by the prices that the other
operators have selected. Namely:
λCi = log
αi
1−
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
(61)
Whether each operator i will agree and adopt this price or not,
depends on the respective accrued revenue, RCi (λCi , λ−i).
In the sequel, we examine and analyze jointly the solutions
of the above optimization problems and derive the exact best
response of the ith operator for each vector λ−i of the I − 1
prices.
Lemma A.2. For each operator i ∈ I, if (1, λ−i) /∈ ΛA, then
there is no best response price λ∗i , such that (λ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛA.
That is, operator i will not select ΛA.
Proof: Given that the price vector λ ∈ ΛA, best response
price is:
λAi =
{
1 if (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA,
l0 + ǫ if (1, λ−i) /∈ ΛA.
(62)
where l0 = λCi is the price operator i selects when λ ∈ ΛC.
If (1, λ−i) /∈ ΛA, then l0 + ǫ > 1. Otherwise price
vector (l0 + ǫ, λ−i) will not belong to ΛA. Therefore, RAi (·)
is a decreasing function at the point λi = λ0 + ǫ due to
quasi-concavity property. Therefore, if (1, λ−i) /∈ ΛA, then
RCi (l0) = R
A
i (l0) > R
A
i (l0 + ǫ) which means that λCi always
gives better response than λAi .
Lemma A.3. Let us denote with µ∗i the optimal solution of
the unconstraint problem PBi . For each operator i ∈ I, if
(µ∗i , λ−i) /∈ ΛB , then there is no best response price λ∗i , such
that (λ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB.
Proof: Given that the price vector λ ∈ ΛB, best response
price is:
λBi =
{
µ∗i if (µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB,
l0 − ǫ if (µ∗i , λ−i) /∈ ΛB.
(63)
and recall that λCi = l0. If (µ∗i , λ−i) /∈ ΛB , then l0 − ǫ <
µ∗i . Otherwise, the price vector (l0 − ǫ, λ−i) cannot be in
ΛB . Therefore, RBi (·) is an increasing function at the point
λi = λ0 − ǫ due to quasi-concavity property. Therefore, if
(µ∗i , λ−i) /∈ ΛB, then RCi (l0) = RBi (l0) > RBi (l0 − ǫ) which
means that λCi always gives better response than λBi .
In other words, the previous two Lemmas state that the only
eligible best response for each operator i ∈ I in the price sets
ΛA and ΛB are prices λ∗i = 1 and and λ∗i = µ∗i respectively.
Theorem A.4. The best response price of an operator i is:
λ∗i =


1, if (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA,
µ∗i , if (µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB,
λCi = l0, otherwise.
(64)
Proof: First we prove that (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA and (µ∗i , λ−i) ∈
ΛB cannot be true at the same time. Since µ∗i is the optimal
solution of unconstraint RBi :
dRBi (λi)
dλi
= 0⇒ eµ
∗
i (µ∗i − 1) =
αi∑
j 6=i αje
−λj
(65)
It is obvious that equation (65) can only hold when µ∗i > 1.
Note that if (µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB , the vector λ = (l, λ−i) ∈ ΛB
for any price l < µ∗i . Hence, it should also hold that λ =
(1, λ−i) ∈ ΛB. With a similar reasoning, when (1, λ−i) ∈
ΛA, (l, λ−i) ∈ ΛA holds for any price l > 1 and therefore
(µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛA. Also, if (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA, λCi cannot be a best
response, because RAi (1) > RAi (λCi ) = RCi (λCi ). Similarly, if
(µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB , λ
C
i is not a best response.
Finally, from Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3, we can say
that λCi dominates all other prices if (1, λ−i) /∈ ΛA and
(µ∗i , λ−i) /∈ ΛB which concludes the proof.
E. Existence and Convergence Analysis of Nash Equilibriums
In the previous section, we derived the best response strat-
egy for each player of the game GP . The next important steps
are (i) to explore the existence of Nash Equilibriums (NE) for
GP , and (ii) to study if the convergence to them is guaranteed.
In [12], it is proven that if the game can be modeled as
a potential game, not only the existence of pure NEs are
ensured, but also convergence to them is guaranteed under
any finite improvement path. In other words, a potential game
always converges to pure NE when the players adjust their
strategies based on accumulated observations as game unfolds.
In this section, we provide the necessary definitions for ordinal
potential games, and we prove that game GP belongs in this
class of games.
Definition A.5. A game (I, λ, {Ri}) is an ordinal potential
game, if there is a potential function P : [0, λmax]→ R such
that the following condition holds:
sgn(P(λi, λ−i)− P(λ
′
i, λ−i)) =
sgn(Ri(λi, λ−i)−Ri(λ
′
i, λ−i))∀i ∈ I, λi, λ
′
i ∈ [0, λmax]
(66)
where sgn(·) is the sign function.
Lemma A.6. The game GP is an ordinal potential game.
Proof: We define the potential function as:
P(λ) =
{∑I
j=1 (logλj − λj), if
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj ≤ 1,∑I
j=1 (logλj − λj)− log (
∑I
j=1 αje
−λj ), else.
(67)
Therefore,
P (λi, λ−i)− P(λ
′
i, λ−i) =
=


log λie
λ
′
i
λ
′
ie
λi
, ifλi, λ
′
i ≥ l0
log
λie
λ
′
i(αie
−λ
′
i +
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj )
λ
′
ie
λi(αie−λi +
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj )
, ifλi, λ
′
i < l0
log
λie
λ
′
i
λ
′
ie
λi(αie−λi +
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj )
λi < l0, ifλ
′
i ≥ l0
log
λie
λ
′
i(αie
−λ
′
i +
∑
j 6=i αje
−λj )
eλiλ
′
i
ifλi ≥ l0, λ
′
i < l0
where l0 = log(αi/(1 −
∑
j 6=i(αje
−λj ))). Moreover, using
(47),
logRi =


log λi
eλi
+ logαiN if λi ≥ l0,
log
λi
eλi( αi
eλi
+
∑
j 6=i
αj
eλj
)
+ logαiN if λi < l0.
Now, it is straightforward to show that P(λi, λ−i) −
P(λ′i, λ−i) = logRi(λi, λ−i) − logRi(λ
′
i, λ−i) for any
operator i ∈ I and for any λi, λ′i ∈ [0, λmax]. Since
logRi(λi, λ−i) − logRi(λ′i, λ−i) has always same sign as
Ri(λi, λ−i)−Ri(λ′i, λ−i), condition given in (66) is satisfied,
and game GP is an ordinal potential game.
F. Detailed Analysis of Nash Equilibriums
In the previous section, we proved the existence of pure
NE and convergence to them. In this section, we extend our
analysis further in order to find these NEs. For the sake of
simplicity, we consider the case where all the operators have
same amount of available spectrum Wi = W and hence αi =
α, ∀i ∈ I.
Before starting our analysis, we rewrite constraint of set ΛA
given in eq. (39) as follows:
α ≤
1∑
j∈I e
−λj
=
H({eλj |j ∈ I})
I
(68)
where H(·) is the harmonic mean function of the variables
(eλ1 , eλ2 , . . . , eλI ) = ({eλj |j ∈ I}):
H({eλj |j ∈ I}) =
I
e−λ1 + e−λ2 + . . .+ e−λI
(69)
Therefore, if λ ∈ ΛA, it is:
H({eλj |j ∈ I}) ≥ αI (70)
Similarly, according to (45), if λ ∈ ΛB then:
H({eλj |j ∈ I}) ≤ αI (71)
and finally, if λ ∈ ΛC :
H({eλj |j ∈ I}) = αI (72)
Next, we define a new variable, h as the natural logarithm of
the harmonic mean:
h = logH({eλj |j ∈ I}) (73)
Note that, since eh is the harmonic mean of {eλj |j ∈ I}, we
can say that one of the following should hold:
1) Every operator i ∈ I adopts the same price λi = h.
2) If one operator j ∈ I selects a price λj < h, then there
must be at least one other operator k ∈ I who will adopt
a price λk > h.
Additionally, we define the variable h−i which is similar to h
except that price of the ith operator is excluded. That is:
h−i = log(H({e
λj |j ∈ I \ i})) (74)
It is obvious that if λi > h, then h−i < h, if λi < h, then
h−i > h, and if λi = h, then h−i = h.
Lemma A.7. If α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I), there is a unique NE
λ∗ ∈ ΛA, with λ∗ = (λ∗i = 1 : i ∈ I)
Proof: First, we prove that the NE cannot be in ΛB or
ΛC (λ∗ /∈ ΛB ∪ΛC ) if α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I). Notice that, when
the price vector is not in ΛA, h ≤ log(αI) < 1 for given α
values. Therefore there exists at least one operator with price
less than one. Since RBi is an increasing function between
λi ∈ (0, 1), operators with λi < 1 would gain more revenue
by unilaterally increasing their prices. Therefore λ∗ can only
be in ΛA. According to Theorem A.4, given that the price
vector is in ΛA, optimal price for any operator i can only be
λAi = 1 if (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA. Since λ∗ = (λ∗i = 1 : i ∈ I) ∈ ΛA
when α ∈ A1, it is a feasible and unique solution.
Lemma A.8. µ∗i is always between II−1 and h−i
Proof: We can rewrite equation (65) as follows:
eµ
∗
i (µ∗i − 1) =
eh−i
I − 1
(75)
where h−i is defined in equation (74). Now, if h−i < II−1 ,
or equivalently if h−i − 1 < 1I−1 , then λ
∗
i should be greater
than h−i in order to satisfy (75). Moreover, if λ∗i > h−i,
then λ∗i − 1 should be less than 1I−1 in order to satisfy (75).
Therefore, h−i < λ∗i < II−1 . Similarly, if h−i ≥
I
I−1 , then
I
I−1 ≤ λ
∗
i ≤ h−i, which proves the lemma.
Lemma A.9. If α ∈ A3 = (eI/(I−1),∞), there is a unique
NE λ∗ ∈ ΛB , with λ∗ = (λ∗i = I/(I − 1) : i ∈ I)
Proof: First we prove that there is no NE in ΛA if α ≥
e/I (i.e. if α ∈ A2∪A3). According to Theorem A.4, optimal
price for any operator i can only be λAi = 1 if (1, λ−i) ∈ ΛA.
Otherwise λCi dominates λAi . Since λ∗ = (λ∗i = 1 : i ∈ I) /∈
ΛA when α ∈ A2 ∪A3, there is no NE in ΛA.
Secondly, we prove that there is no NE in ΛC if α ∈ A3 =
(eI/(I−1),∞). Recall that, when the price vector is in ΛC ,
h = log(αI) > I/(I − 1), which means that there exists
at least one operator with price λCi > I/(I − 1) and λCi ≥
h. Remember that if λi ≥ h, then h−i ≤ h, so λi ≥ h−i.
Therefore, for an operator i, λCi is greater than both h−i and
I/(I − 1). According to Theorem A.4 and Lemma A.8, when
(µ∗i , λ−i) ∈ ΛB , best response price of operator i is µ∗i which
is between h−i and I/(I−1). This means that for at least one
operator, λCi is greater than µ∗i , which implies that (µ∗i , λ−i) ∈
ΛB . This operator can increase his revenue by reducing his
price to µ∗i . Therefore, there is no NE in λC for the given α
values, and we proved that the NE can only be in ΛB.
Finally, we prove that the only NE is λ∗ = (λ∗i = I/(I−1) :
i ∈ I), if α ∈ A3. According to Lemma A.8, µ∗i is between
h−i and I/(I − 1) for all operators. h can be greater than or
less than I/(I−1). If h ≥ I/(I−1), unless all of the operators
set their prices to I/(I−1), there exists at least one operator i
with price λi greater than both h−i and I/(I−1). Hence, λi is
also greater than µ∗i and this operator can increase his revenue
by reducing his price to µ∗i . Similarly, if h < I/(I − 1), there
exists at least one operator with price λi less than both h−i and
I/(I−1). This operator can increase his revenue by increasing
his price. If all the operators set their prices to λi = I/(I−1),
the price vector is in ΛB and none of the operators can increase
his revenue by unilaterally changing his price. Therefore, the
only NE is λ∗ = (λ∗i = I/(I − 1) : i ∈ I).
Hence the lemma is proved.
Lemma A.10. If α ∈ A2 = [e/I, eI/(I−1)], a NE can only be
in ΛC .
Proof: In the proof of the Lemma A.9, we showed that
there is no NE in ΛA, if α ∈ A2. We can also prove that
there is no NE in ΛB for the given range of α values. If the
price vector is in ΛB and α < e
I/(I−1)
I , then h < I/(I − 1).
Therefore, there is at least one operator with price λi ≤ h−i
and λi < I/(I−1), who can increase his revenue by increasing
his price. So we conclude that, if α ∈ A2 = [e/I, eI/(I−1)],
there is no NE in ΛA or ΛB.
Lemma A.11. If α ∈ A2 = [e/I, eI/(I−1)], λ∗ ∈ ΛC with
λ∗ = (λ∗i = log(Iα) : i ∈ I) is a NE.
Proof: When all the operators set the same price λ∗i =
log(Iα) and α ∈ A2 = [e/I, eI/(I−1)], log(Iα) is between
1 and µ∗i for all operators (this can be verified through
equation (65)). Therefore, for any operator i, (1, λ−i) /∈ ΛA
and (µ∗i , λ−i) /∈ ΛB . Then, according to Theorem A.4, best
response price is λCi which is equal to log(Iα). Hence, no
operator can gain more revenue by unilaterally changing his
price, and λ∗ = (λ∗i = log(Iα) : i ∈ I) is a NE.
Finally we analyze the NE for boundary values of A2, i.e.
for α = e/I and α = eI/(I−1)/I . In the previous lemma, it is
proven that λ∗ = (λ∗i = log(Iα) : i ∈ I) is a NE if α ∈ A2.
We can also prove that it is the only NE for these boundary
values. In Lemma A.10, it is proven that any NE is in ΛC for
these α values. So, when α = e/I , h = log(Iα) = 1, which
means that unless all of the users set their prices to one, there
exists some operators with λi < 1. These operators would gain
more revenue by setting their prices to one. Hence, the only
NE is λ∗i = log(Iα) = 1. Similarly, when α = eI/(I−1)/I ,
h = log(Iα) = I/(I − 1). This means that unless all of the
users set their prices to I/(I− 1), there exists some operators
with λi greater than both h−i and M/(M−1). These operators
would gain more revenue by reducing their prices. Hence, the
only NE is λ∗i = log(Iα) = I/(I − 1).
We also show that when α ∈ (e/I, eI/(I−1)), there can be
infinitely many NEs, all in ΛC , via numerical simulations. For
different initial price settings, the game converges to different
NE.
Theorem A.12. The game GP attains a pure NE which
depends on the value of parameter α as follows:
• If α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I), there is a unique NE λ∗ ∈ ΛA,
with λ∗ = (λ∗i = 1 : i ∈ I) and respective market
equilibrium x∗ ∈ XA.
• If α ∈ A3 = (e II−1 /I,∞), there is a unique NE λ∗ ∈
ΛB, with λ∗ = (λ∗i = II−1 : i ∈ I), which induces a
respective market equilibrium x∗ ∈ XB .
• If α ∈ A2 = [e/I, e II−1 /I], there exist infinitely many
NEs, λ∗ ∈ ΛC , and each one of them yields a respective
market stationary point x∗ ∈ XC .
Proof: Lemma A.6 proves that the game GP is a finite
ordinal potential game. Therefore, it always attains a pure NE.
Lemma A.7 proves the case for α ∈ A1 = (0, e/I). Lemma
A.9 proves the case for α ∈ A3 = (e
I
I−1 /I,∞). The case
for α ∈ A2 = [e/I, e
I
I−1 /I] is proven in Lemma A.10 and
Lemma A.11.
